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Purpose 
Scandals in the Australian financial services industry highlights the conflicts of interest 
between those who provide financial advice (financial planners) and their clients. Disclosure 
is a potential governance tool to manage these conflicts of interest by reducing asymmetries in 
information. Yet, the efficacy of disclosure is questionable as scandals persist, so we research 
the effectiveness of disclosure in financial planning. 
Design/methodology/approach 
This research used a qualitative approach involving the triangulation of data from 
parliamentary inquiries in financial services with data collected in semi-structured interviews 
with financial planning professionals.  
Findings  
The findings draw a clear portrayal of the disclosure requirements and illustrate how disclosure 
processes are onerous and complex. Starting with detangling the complex interactions between 
the beneficial role of disclosure in reducing information asymmetry and unethical behaviour 
and the detrimental effect of information overload, we then highlight effective disclosure 
techniques utilised by financial planners, including visualisation of material information. Our 
study reveals that financial planners perceive their role as filtering information for clients and 
ensuring clients’ comprehension, due to the onerous disclosure requirements.  
Research limitations/implications 
The study is of interest to researchers, practitioners, policymakers, and society as it implies that 
how disclosure occurs is as important as what information is disclosed. Those who wish to 
foster effective disclosure in the financial services industry need to consider the quantity, 
quality, and process of disclosure. A limitation is our research focuses on financial planning 
practices and not client outcomes, which could be considered in future research. 
Originality/value 
 The study adds to the understanding of how disclosure is utilised as a governance tool, and 
how the quantity of information may impede the effectiveness of disclosure in the financial 
planning industry. In addition, the study identifies and elaborates on the influential factors and 
best practices for enhancing the disclosure effectiveness by financial planners. 
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Financial planning is an emerging profession that has evolved as a separate vocation from 
insurance broking, law, and accountancy (Cull, 2009; Murphy, 2018). Recently, financial 
planning has attracted great government and media attention worldwide (Chauhan and Dey, 
2020). Some of the attention is due to a dual agency role of financial planners where they are 
agents for clients, but also agents for financial product providers, creating conflicts of interest 
(Chen and Richardson, 2018; Richards and Morton, 2020). These conflicts of interest are 
exemplified by the scandals which persist in this industry (Steen et al., 2016). One response to 
such controversy has been to increase the disclosure requirements of a financial planner when 
providing advice to clients (McInnes, 2020). The logic underlining this proposition is that 
disclosure will reduce information asymmetry and unethical behaviour (Luo et al., 2019; Nagar 
et al., 2019). However, it remains unknown how increased disclosure could serve as an 
effective governance mechanism for financial planning. 
One school of thought suggests that unethical behaviour is eliminated by transparent 
disclosure. Enhancing transparency, through a good governance structure, enforces quality 
disclosure and assists informed decision making (Mallin et al., 2004). Some studies on 
corporate governance and environmental disclosure illustrate that a high level of disclosure is 
an effective corporate governance tool for alleviating principal-agent problems (Aksu and 
Kosedag, 2006; Patten and Trompeter, 2003; Francis, et al., 2008). However, an alternative 
perspective is expressed by the International Accounting Standards Board ([IASB] 2017) 
which identifies problems with excessive disclosure as being either irrelevant or ineffective 
communication of information. In addition, large disclosures of information may lead to 
information overload, reducing the effectiveness of disclosure (Saha et al., 2019). The dual 
agency role of financial planners, with the use of disclosure as a remedy, makes studies into 
disclosure in financial planning of the utmost importance.  
Highlighting the importance of policy implications of disclosure studies, Kozup et al., 
(2012) assert that additional studies are required in many areas, particularly research on human 
factors, to help enable effective disclosure policies and practices. The financial planning 
industry has a significant societal impact with 2.3 million Australian people receiving financial 
advice in 2016 (Australian Securities and Investment Commission [ASIC], 2017a). Despite 
this, the literature on disclosure in financial planning is scarce (Steen et al., 2016) although, 
disclosure is frequently debated in the accounting literature (Saha et al., 2019). Our research 
addresses three key dimensions of disclosure in the financial planning industry. First, the study 
adds to the understanding of how disclosure is used as a governance tool to balance information 
asymmetries and to protect clients from potential conflicts of interest in the financial planning 
industry. Second, the study shows how the quantity of information may impede the 
effectiveness of disclosure in this industry; and finally, the study identifies and elaborates on 
the influential factors and best practices for enhancing the disclosure effectiveness by financial 
planners. A qualitative methodology, which involved content analysis of parliamentary 
inquiries and semi-structured interviews, was used to research these topics.   
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Our findings first describe the process of disclosure in financial planning in Australia, 
outlining how it is onerous and complicated because multiple parties are involved with 
constructing disclosure documentation. The high volume of information disclosed causes 
information overload for clients and simultaneously becomes burdensome for financial 
planners. Next, we found that financial planners are of the opinion that most clients do not 
commonly read all the information disclosed. Thus, the role of the financial planner has become 
an information filterer who highlights important aspects to clients. This could provide an 
opportunity for financial planners to accentuate specific information favourable to their benefit. 
To provide solutions that enhance the quality of disclosure, results from this study suggest that 
regulating certain practices of disclosing information to clients would be beneficial. These 
include the importance of the initial meeting, face-to-face communication, clear and concise 
statements of advice, and visualisation of material information. The wide-ranging implications 
of the study for policy, practice, research, society, and educational purposes are elaborated later 
in the paper. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is a literature review in 
which financial planning is defined; the section also reviews the Australian financial planning 
industry, agency theory, and finally the benefits and detriments of disclosure. The methodology 
and data are discussed in section 3 and findings are presented in section 4. A discussion of 
results is provided in section 5. Section 6 draws conclusions from the study.  
2. Literature review and conceptual framework 
2.1. Defining financial planning 
Broadly defined, financial advice refers to information that is provided to influence a 
decision regarding a financial product (Richards and Morton, 2020). However, a distinction 
made by the ASIC is between personal and general advice.  ASIC (2017b, pp. 10-11) defines 
personal financial advice as “circumstances where… the person giving or directing the advice 
has considered one or more of the client’s objectives, financial situation, and needs …or a 
reasonable person might expect the person giving or directing the advice to have considered 
one or more of these matters”. ASIC (2017b) defines general advice as advice that is not 
personal. The personal advice definition reconciles with definitions of financial planning. 
Warschauer (2001 cited in Warschauer, 2002, p. 204) defines financial planning as “...the 
process that takes into account client’s personality, financial status and the socio-economic and 
legal environments and leads to the adoption of strategies and use of tools that are expected to 
aid in achieving the clients’ financial goals.”  In our research, we use the term financial planner 
as an advisor who provides personal financial advice. There are some industry professionals, 
such as financial advisors and accountants, who are not financial planners but do provide 
personal financial advice. Our research is also applicable to these professionals. 
2.2. Financial planning in Australia 
Financial planners in Australia historically came from a sales background (Cull, 2009) and 
this legacy remains.  Reforming the financial services industry to counter this sales orientation 
has been an ongoing activity in Australia since 1997, when a parliamentary inquiry, known 
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colloquially as the Wallis Report, recommended many changes to Australia’s regulatory 
system and financial services (Hogan, 1997; McKeown, 2017). The Wallis Report noted a 
strong need to improve consumer protection in financial services. Thus, acts such as the 
Financial Services Reform Act (FSRA) 2001 and Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act 2001, have 
aimed to professionalise financial advice through the creation of a regulatory body (ASIC), 
instalment of a licencing regime, and uniforming disclosure in financial services. The 
disclosure requirements are product disclosure statements (PDS), financial service guides 
(FSG), and a statement of advice (SoA). These are outlined in more detail in section 4.1.  
Despite these initiatives, there have been persistent issues and scandals in financial advice, 
leading to more inquiries and reforms (McInnes, 2020).   
More recently, the Australian government initiated two broad changes to financial advice; 
an increase in fiduciary duty (Batten and Pearson, 2013) and an increase in financial planners’ 
educational, ethical and professional requirements (Financial Adviser Standards and Ethics 
Authority [FASEA], 2019). An increased fiduciary duty was incorporated through the Future 
of Financial Advice (FoFA) reforms from 1st July 2013 which mandated that financial planners 
must base advice on what is in their client’s best interest. FoFA also banned conflicted 
remuneration structures where financial planners receive remuneration from financial product 
providers that instil a conflict with fiduciary duty. In addition, FoFA mandated two additional 
disclosures which are an annual fee disclosure statement and an opt-in obligation (where clients 
must renew agreements to be charged on-going fees; see (Kingston and Weng, 2014; North, 
2015)). There have also been calls to increase the educational standards, professional standards, 
and ethical values of financial planners (Steen, et al., 2016). Some of the initiatives 
implemented include a degree or equivalent level requirement for financial planners, a national 
examination undertaken by financial planners, and financial planners must adhere to a 
professional code of ethics (FASEA, 2019). The thrust of these reforms has been to strengthen 
the professionalism of financial planning by increasing education and ethical levels.  
The governance mechanism used in financial advice is a licensing regime (McInnes, 
2020). Under this regime, a financial services organisation obtains an Australian Financial 
Service (AFS) licence from ASIC and then authorises financial planners to practice as 
authorised representatives (financial planners can individually obtain their AFS licence but 
rarely do). In addition, financial product providers, who create the financial products that 
financial planners recommend to their clients need to obtain an AFS licence. The licencing 
regime awards significant power to the AFS licensee over financial planners (Richards and 
Morton, 2020). In addition, vertical integration has occurred where AFS licensee providing 
financial planning services are amalgamated or connected with financial product providers 
(Chen and Richardson, 2019). This creates conflicts of interest as a financial planner must 
weigh the interests of their AFS licensee against the interests of their client (Chen and 
Richardson, 2018; Richards and Morton, 2020).   
In summary, a key driver within Australian financial planning is a move towards a ‘client’s 
best interest’ model and away from a ‘product provider interest’s’ model. However, the 
licencing regime does not structure a strict separation between those making financial products 
and those authorising financial planners to give advice. This occurs in large financial 
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institutions but is less obvious for those financial planners who appear independent but are 
authorised by AFS licensees who create financial products. A means of managing these 
conflicts of interest is for a financial planner to disclose this information to the client. Next, 
this paper reviews disclosure as a method of managing conflicts of interest.   
2.3. Agency theory, conflicts of interests and financial planning 
Financial planners in Australia exist in an environment with agent-principal issues due 
to conflicts of interest (Chen and Richardson 2019; Richards and Morton, 2020). Acting as 
both a client’s and financial product provider’s agent sets financial planners in dual agency 
roles, which could trigger agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory is 
normally used to describe a principal and agent relationship, where the agents (managers) may 
have different interests than the principals (shareholders) (Latimer and Maume, 2015). Here 
we use it to explain how financial planners (agents) have contrasting interests than clients 
(principals) due to the demands and rewards placed on financial planners by financial 
institutions. Latimer and Maume (2015 pp. 38) theorise that “disclosure will allow the 
monitoring of what the agent is doing to ensure that the agent is acting in the interests of the 
principal”. In particular, disclosure can reduce information asymmetry where clients are 
unaware of the other interests which financial planners may have.  In such an environment, 
disclosure could be used as a governance tool to mitigate agency problems and information 
asymmetries between financial planners and their clients (Chen and Richardson, 2018; Cheung 
and Hu, 2019).   
2.4. Benefits of disclosure  
Some literature illustrates that disclosure is a useful tool for managing the agent-principal 
problem. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ([OECD] 2015) 
describes transparency as management providing a clear and current representation of company 
affairs through timely and adequate disclosure on important aspects of a company such as its 
financial performance (Aksu and Kosedag 2006; Sharar 2006). Hirst and Hopkins (1998) argue 
that the quality of financial reporting will be enhanced by providing more transparent 
disclosure and this, in turn, enhances financial analysts’ judgments. Patten and Trompeter 
(2003), in a study of disclosure, focused on environmental disclosure, and defended the 
effectiveness of higher environmental disclosure as a corporate governance tool for lessening 
accruals manipulation. Francis et al., (2008) focus on the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
financial reporting quality and concluded that higher quality in reports is significantly related 
to a higher level of voluntary disclosure.   
The main aspects of quality disclosure considered in the literature are its ‘timeliness’ and 
the ‘nature’ of disclosure, which should ideally be factual, objective and consist of all material 
information (Edmonds et al., 2017; Schmidt and Wilkins 2013). In addition, the type of 
information that should be disclosed, who is in charge of deciding which information must be 
disclosed, and the monitoring of compliance are some of the issues that must be considered in 
companies’ continuous disclosure policies. Comprehensiveness and transparency are identified 
as other characteristics of high-quality disclosure (Han et al., 2012). It’s commonly suggested 
that relevant information should be provided to users in order to eliminate the surprise factor 
and that providing information about senior executives’ employment agreements and 
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remuneration will alleviate any element of surprise. The OECD’s (2015) disclosure and 
transparency principles deal with users’ equal and easy access to information and the need for 
timely, accurate, objective, and material information. The scope of disclosed information 
covers a company’s financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance (OECD 
2015).  
The relationship between financial misconduct and disclosure quality is generally 
approached by combining two prior research streams (Jo and Kim, 2007): (1) studies that test 
disclosure quality and information asymmetry and (2) studies that investigate the relationship 
between information asymmetry and unethical behaviour (Lobo and Zhou, 2001; Welker, 
1995). Jo and Kim (2007) find that entities with extensive and frequent disclosure will reduce 
information asymmetry and enhance transparency. Correspondingly, Lobo and Zhou (2001) 
show a negative relationship between the extent, quality, and informativeness of disclosure 
with misconduct and unethical behaviour. Prior research suggests that reducing information 
asymmetry is one of the potential benefits of disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Lobo and 
Zhou, 2001). Dye (1988) introduces information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders and between investors and prospective investors as two factors that generate 
misconduct. Similarly, Richardson (2000) shows a significant positive association between 
information asymmetry levels and financial misconduct. Generally, the findings of prior 
literature suggest a negative relationship between disclosure quality and information 
asymmetry (Welker, 1995).  
Research from the marketing field outlines that disclosure can offer benefits for 
consumers. Garrison et al., (2012) discuss disclosure as a key component of consumer 
production policy and an instrument that could potentially help consumers understand the 
product features. They suggest the identification of key pieces of information, the use of 
principles of information design, and the thoughtful layering of the information essential to 
consumer understandability and usability. Similarly, in the context of consumer affairs Kozup 
et al., (2012, p.314) define a sound disclosure as “the direct linkage of a policy standard to a 
dedicated, rigorous consumer testing methodology that measures explicitly stated 
communication objectives put forth in the policy”. 
Although there have been extensive studies in the area of financial misconduct and the 
quality of disclosure (such as by Dye, 1988; Richardson, 2000; Trueman and Titman, 1988), 
and consumer affairs (Garrison et al., 2012), there has been little research in disclosure quality 
in the realm of the financial planning, despite its unique settings and disclosure requirements. 
Inderst and Ottaviani (2012), in a study on investigation of the determinants of the 
compensation structure for brokers in the financial advice industry, recommend policy 
intervention that mandates disclosure of commissions to protect naive consumers and increase 
welfare. In Australia, the FoFA regulations went further than disclosure of commissions by 
banning conflicted remuneration from product providers to financial planners (Batten and 
Pearson, 2013).  This legislation also reduced associated perks such as soft dollar benefits (such 
as tickets to sporting games) to $300 AUD (Batten and Pearson, 2013). 
2.5. Detriments of disclosure  
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Recent studies, however, reveal detrimental aspects of information disclosure.  The IASB 
noted that disclosure can lack comprehensive information, contain irrelevant information, or 
ineffectively communicate information (IASB, 2017).  Too much disclosure can become 
burdensome and lead to an information overload problem. Saha et al., (2019) note that 
professional accounting bodies from Scotland and New Zealand issued the Excess Baggage 
Report in 2011 to combat the issue of too much information being disclosed. In doing so, the 
Excess Baggage Report classifies current International Financial Reporting Standards 
disclosure requirement items into three categories of retain, delete, and disclose if material 
(Saha et al., 2019). They find that those delete items are the least frequently disclosed items by 
Australian companies. 
Psychological research into advice has unveiled interesting findings on advisors’ and 
advisees’ behavioural biases (Cain et al., 2005; Cain et al., 2011; Sahi, and Arora, 2012).  Some 
literature asserts that recipients of advice may fail to accurately discount bias in advice when 
conflicts of interest are disclosed to them, suggesting that disclosure may not fully mitigate 
conflicts of interest (Cain et al., 2005; Sah and Lowenstein, 2014). Cain et al., (2011) attribute 
strategic exaggeration and moral licencing as reasons why advisors give more biased advice. 
Due to strategic exaggeration, advisors could give more biased advice to allow for discounting 
by the advisee when they receive the disclosure. Moral licencing could increase advisor bias 
because the practice of disclosing conflicts of interest will remove the moral responsibility of 
the advisor because the advisee has been informed (Cain et al., 2011). However, a recent 
financial planning experiment with conflicts of interest did not find evidence of strategic 
exaggeration or moral licensing (Chen and Richardson, 2018). 
Cull and Sloan, (2016) introduced seven affective characteristics of trust as an essential 
element in building the client-advisor relationship. These characteristics include vulnerability, 
feeling, honesty, faith, best interests, accountability, and competence. Out of these 
characteristics they found honesty, with fees and commission earned by the advisor through 
the declaration of their remuneration clearly and upfront, one of the most relevant trust 
characteristics to the disclosure practices. Sah (2012) found that disclosure can decrease trust 
by an advisee of their advisor but also increase an advisee’s duty to comply. Conversely, when 
disclosure occurs online (in a blog) by an advisor, an advisee’s trust towards an advisor 
increases because the disclosure acts as a heuristic cue of integrity (Sah et al., 2018). Sah et 
al., (2018, pp. 18) investigated the reason for the inconsistent results and found that disclosure 
increased trust when advisees do not deliberate on the disclosure. They suggest that when 
advisees are presented with a lot of information to process, disclosure of conflicts of interest 
acts as a heuristic cue to trust the advisor. This research suggests that disclosure in person (and 
not online) and limiting the amount of other information advisees receive, could increase 
disclosure effectiveness.  
In the context of the social economy sector (SES), Ghoorah (2019) explains the necessity 
and importance of financial disclosures by SES organizations as part of their accountability 
obligations. Nonetheless, a high volume of disclosure is also widely perceived as a problem as 
it may cause confusion by overloading users (Edmunds and Morris, 2000; Naynar et al., 2018; 
Stolowy and Paugam, 2018). In addition, drawing from behavioural models of rational choice, 
Chapman et al., (2019) asserts that a combination of information overload and users’ time 
 
Page 9 of 27 
 
 
constraints would make the users susceptible to biases that can undercut the effectiveness of 
disclosure. Edmunds and Morris (2000) suggest the utilization of technology such as software 
solutions or information specialists to filter value-added information, as a solution for the 
information overload problem.  
In summary, research on disclosure illustrates the relevance of this in financial planning 
for addressing an agency principal problem.  It suggests that asymmetric information can be 
reduced by disclosure, however, there are benefits and detriments of the disclosure. To make 
disclosure effective, the quality of disclosure must be high. Furthermore, excessive disclosure 
could potentially be maladaptive, and the method of disclosing information could be important 
in making it effective. Our study focuses on addressing the following three key questions: 
1. How is disclosure used in the financial planning industry as a governance tool to 
balance information asymmetries and to protect clients from potential conflicts of 
interest?  
2. How does the quantity of information impede the effectiveness of disclosure in the 
financial planning industry?   
3. What are the influential factors and best practices for enhancing the disclosure 
effectiveness in the financial planning industry?  
3. Methodology 
We adopted a qualitative approach to address our research questions because this allowed new 
ideas and new information to emerge while the research was undertaken (Bryman and Bell, 
2015). The qualitative approach comprised of two phases conducted iteratively. The first phase 
involved content analysis of government inquiries and the second phase included in-depth 
interviews with financial planning professionals.   
The archival data analysed in the first phase of research were the inquiries held by Australia’s 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (PJCCFS) and the 
Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry (hereafter called the Royal Commission). This PJCCFS reviews industry-wide issues 
in Australia’s financial system and reports findings to the government for policy 
recommendations. The process begins with the PJCCFS announcing the terms of references 
for the inquiry. Then, public submissions are collected, a careful review of information is 
conducted and then the PJCCFS draft a report (Parliament of Australia, 2017). These PJCCFS 
reports offered data on the industry-wide issues in financial planning. The researchers reviewed 
63 inquiries and selected 21 of these for a more in-depth analysis, finding that the 5 outlined in 
Table 1 were pertinent for our research. In addition to the PJCCFS reports, we analysed the 
Royal Commission as this was also a public inquiry into the financial services industry. The 
Royal Commission published an interim report in 2018 and a final report in 2019. We analysed 
the PJCCFS reports and the Royal Commission to generate theories regarding disclosure in 
financial planning. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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The second phase of the research was to test theories through in-depth and semi-
structured interviews on disclosure with 12 financial planning professionals. This methodology 
is similar to direct content analysis, where it aims to validate or extend prior theory generated 
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Qu and Dumay (2011, pp. 255) state “The benefit of the research 
interview lies in its unique ability to uncover the private and sometimes incommunicable social 
world of the interviewee, to gain insight into alternative assumptions and ways of seeing”. 
Thus, ten financial planners and two financial services managers were interviewed to ascertain 
insights into disclosure quality and quantity issues. It was important to understand the 
perspective of financial planners as this perspective was missing from prior research (Chen and 
Richardson, 2018; Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012). The unstructured parts of the interviews 
provided information about the potential for policy enhancements, especially where quality, 
quantity, or presentation of the information seemed to be problematic (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1993). Ethics approval was obtained from the university ethics committee and 
informed consent was obtained from the participants before interviews were conducted. The 
interviews, summarised in Table 2, were recorded at the respondent’s consent and transcribed 
to enable analysis. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
This research involved the triangulation of the two types of data collected (Kaczynski et 
al., 2014). We reviewed the information from the archival data to ascertain background 
information and terminology prior to conducting interviews. Six interviews were then 
conducted broadly around the concept of governance and disclosure in financial planning. 
Analysis of the archival data was reconciled with interviews and provided preliminary results. 
The method used to analyse this data was thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006), and the 
analysis was conducted using Nvivo 12 software. In total, the researchers identified six themes 
that pertained to disclosure: 1) information transparency vs overload on clients, 2) quantity of 
information, 3) quality of information, 4) improvements to disclosure, 5) presentation of 
information, 6) general disclosure issues. Following this analysis, a further six semi-structured 
interviews were conducted and analysed to verify and clarify these findings. 
       4. Findings 
4.1 Description of disclosure in Australian financial planning  
The first finding of our research pertains to how disclosure is used as a governance tool to 
balance information asymmetries and to protect clients from potential conflicts of interest in 
the financial planning industry. To address this topic, an understanding of the disclosure 
process is required.  This is illustrated in Figure 1 and here we briefly outline who creates the 
various documents and the purpose of the documents to illustrate the disclosure process in 
financial planning in Australia. Disclosure requirements centre around three documents, which 
are the PDS, FSG, and an SoA. Additionally, two more requirements are a fee disclosure 
statement (FDS) and an opt-in requirement.     
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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The PDS is created by the financial product provider and it details important aspects of the 
product provided which retail clients need. For each product recommended, a financial planner 
must disclose its PDS. According to the regulator, ASIC (2011), a PDS should be timely, 
relevant and complete, promote product understanding, promote product comparison, highlight 
important information, and regard consumers’ needs. The FSG is created by the AFS licensee 
but provided to the client by the financial planner. The FSG explains the type of financial 
services being offered and it must be provided at the earliest practical opportunity before a 
service is delivered.  Report 1 (p. 172) states “The primary means by which a financial adviser’s 
conflicts of interest are currently disclosed is through an FSG.” It outlines the information about 
the licensee, the services the licensee provides, remuneration details, and complaint resolution 
methods. Finally, the SoA outlines the advice being given and is generally prepared by 
financial planners. The industry regulator requires that the SoA contains the advice and the 
reasoning that led to the advice, information about remuneration and benefits; all conflicts of 
interest that may affect the advice; and the costs, loss of benefits, and other significant 
consequences when recommending switching between financial products (ASIC, 2017b). 
In situations where financial planners have an ongoing fee arrangement with their retail 
clients, they must provide an FDS on an annual basis (Report 5, p. 27).  Finally, on a biennial 
basis, the licensee must write to clients and receive feedback from them that they choose to 
opt-in to the ongoing fee arrangement (Report 5, p. 27). Report 1 recommended an annual opt-
in practice.   
The review of the disclosure requirements as presented in Figure 1 shows a substantial 
number of documents that must be disclosed by a financial planner to a client. There was a 
view from both the government regulator and by financial planners that clients are faced with 
information overload.  Consider this quote: 
 “I think they [clients] get too much.  I think the regulation forces them to drink from a 
fire hose.  There’s a lot of times when I had to go through things with my clients and 
they were literally saying to me, “I don’t want to read it, I believe you, but where do I 
sign?”  And I’ve gone, “Yeah, but I’ve got to go through these things.” (Respondent F) 
It is important to note that a financial planner does not create most of these documents that 
need to be disclosed, which makes the disclosure more onerous. The financial planning industry 
is very disclosure orientated; a finding confirmed from interviews which viewed disclosure as 
a major governance tool in financial planning. One respondent stated: 
“I think most of the legislation is actually about disclosure, not process. It's all about 
disclose, disclose, disclose to a retail client” (Respondent D)  
The findings revealed that a reason for disclosure requirements could be lessening 
information asymmetry and agency problems. The awareness of information asymmetry 
between a financial planner and some clients was raised in the interviews where it was apparent 
that clients know less than financial planners do. Consider this quote: 
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“So, when you talk about information, yes, advisors would have more information, ...  
because most clients that come to us are experts in their own field, but they come to 
advise us because while they have some idea of investment they know there’s a lot 
more out there they possibly could use and that’s why they come looking for an 
advisor who will basically fit their philosophy.” (Respondent I) 
 
In the government reports it was noted that one purpose of disclosure is to break down this 
information asymmetry: 
“Regulation to protect investors is limited to conduct and disclosure requirements 
imposed on Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) holders. The purpose of 
these is…[to] overcome the information asymmetry between industry participants and 
investors by requiring disclosure of information required to facilitate informed 
decisions by investors” (Report 6, p. 7) 
On the whole, disclosure is used as a governance tool to balance information asymmetries 
and to protect clients by having a large volume of information disclosed by three parties; 
financial planners, AFS licensees, and product providers.  However, the financial planner is 
responsible for ensuring all disclosure is given to clients.   
4.2 Disclosure quantity and effectiveness  
The quantity compared to the quality of information is of utmost importance in financial 
planning disclosure. A finding of this research is that government regulators and financial 
planners believe that clients get more information than they can process.  The large quantity of 
information means that clients do not read the information they are given. Interestingly, 
respondents E and L both noted that they did not read the information when they sought out 
financial advice for themselves. These quotes explain this further: 
“this fallacy that you’re a retail client so you need a Product Disclosure Statement, 
that is going to protect a client from making a mistake, it doesn’t work. (Interviewer: 
Why?) Because no one reads the product disclosure statement in the first place.” 
(Respondent C) 
“By itself, simple disclosure of conflicts of interest is insufficient as a means of 
managing them. The whole regime of disclosure presupposes that what is given to a 
consumer in writing will be read, and if read, will be understood. Often, that 
presupposition is wrong. And given the length and complexity of FSGs and PDSs that 
is unsurprising.” (Report 1, pp. 174-5) 
 
Some financial planners noted that the amount of information overwhelms clients and they 
cannot process the information, impeding understanding by clients. One respondent noted: 
“..the amount of information and rubbish that you get as a retail client with the 
Financial Services Guide and prospectuses and fee disclosure statements and all these 
sorts of things, to be honest, if you've got a good, transparent advisor with a good 
relationship, all this is doing is just getting in the road of that good relationship.” 
(Respondent D) 
 
Page 13 of 27 
 
 
The seemingly large amount of information that needs to be disclosed to clients can 
have maladaptive effects.  Given the quantity of information disclosed, financial planners 
expressed that a part of their job was to filter information and present only that which a client 
needs to know.  Consider these quotes: 
 
“Anecdotal feedback from my clients was ...  ‘I don’t want to know everything.  Just tell 
me what I’ve got to do.’  And my job is to filter out all that stuff.  So they expected me 
to know more, they expected me to have more information, and to filter out what they 
wanted to know and what was the right strategy for them.” (Respondent G) 
“…some clients love the details and have the capacity to digest all the legal wordings 
etc whereas others they do not care so for them you need to take a different approach” 
(Respondent F). 
This illustrates that financial planners believe they have a role in deciding what 
information is relevant for a client (or not) and highlighting or emphasizing the relevant and 
material information. Conversely, from a legislative viewpoint, financial planners must 
disclose all information. Opportunistic attitudes of agents are predicted in agency theory and 
can use this filtering role for their own purposes by presenting information but accentuating 
certain aspects of it. This was noted in government inquiries (Reports 2 and 6) and illustrated 
by this quote by a financial planner:  
“…your remuneration and your conflicts of interest and all that.  So rather than bury 
them in page 45 of your report, I think you should bring them more upfront and say, 
here it is.” (Respondent H) 
In addition, Respondent J noted that a financial planner could emphasise only the 
advantages of a strategy and their client wouldn’t realise they have omitted disadvantages. 
Report 1 notes that disclosure cannot mitigate all conflicts of interest. Thus, the emphasis in 
Australia (noted in Report 3) has been to improve financial planning quality through lifting 
professional, ethical, and educational standards of financial planners rather than through better 
disclosure alone.   
 Another effect is that the legal requirement to disclose information can rid financial 
planners of the responsibility to ensure a client understands the information presented to them.  
This was raised by respondent H and J but summarised aptly in these quotes: 
“the onus is on the advisor, cause the clients are going to sign it or they’re not.  The 
onus is on the advisor to make sure the clients are fully aware of that.  I think that’s 
where discretion comes in where some advisors …think, ‘[if the] Client signs it… I’ve 
done my job.  I’ve given them the information, they decided not to read it, it’s up to 
them’…” (Respondent G) 
“I think this idea of disclosure is sort of like only half the story.  I think the more 
important part as well; the people are coming to you because they don't understand.  
So, I think you have to have an obligation to explain, to make sure they understand.” 
(Respondent H) 
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One reason why there was so much information being presented to clients, was that 
financial planners do not create the information being disclosed. This is created by licensees or 
financial institutions that they work for. These institutions take a compliance orientated 
approach to creating information rather than a communication-based approach. Respondents 
B, D, E, F, and G referred to this as a tick box disclosure approach.  Consider these quotes: 
“One problem is that the present arrangements enable or encourage licensees to take 
a risk-averse approach to compliance, rather than providing disclosure material that 
is focussed on informing consumers. In their submission ASIC noted that disclosure 
documents are often lengthy and complex, reflecting the nature of the products and 
providers' all-encompassing approach to legislative compliance. Such material is 
unlikely to serve informed decision-making where consumers are disengaged or unable 
to comprehend it.” (Report 6, p. 82) 
“Product providers will often provide whatever materials are required to just, make 
compliance requirements.  Most dealergroups [AFS licensees] … will say can you 
provide me the appropriate information that I need to put in the statement of advice 
and they [product providers] will know what is required… so they will be able to 
address the appropriate points.” (Respondent B) 
When financial planners were asked about why they use information from the AFS 
licensee rather than write their own information, they spoke of a necessity to trust the 
information of the licensee:   
“because of the volume of data, you’ve really got to trust your licensee or your research 
house, that is usually employed by your licensee, to provide accurate data.”  
(Respondent G) 
In addition, financial planners and government inquiries added that the complexity of 
information, and its meaning, is hard to communicate via disclosure because disclosure is often 
not relevant to a client’s personal circumstances. This financial planner noted the duality of 
informational purposes by stating this: 
“because they say from one hand we want it to be easy to read, understandable 
language that the client can engage with, so the advisor writes it as storybook, or from 
the other hand we need to cover all the terms and conditions, you need to tick all of 
these and its very rigid”. (Respondent F) 
Overall, the disclosure of information by financial planners is required to address 
asymmetric knowledge between planners and clients.  Yet the amount of information financial 
planners must disclose is high and impedes apt disclosure. Financial planners reported that 
clients do not read all of the information or that clients feel overwhelmed by the amount of 
information. With this volume of information, financial planners view a part of their job as 
focusing the attention of clients on information which is important.  However, financial 
planners could use the volume of information to accentuate the beneficial aspects and hide the 
detrimental aspects.  Disclosing vast quantities of information may reduce a financial planner’s 
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obligation to ensure a client understands this information, especially when the financial 
planners do not create the information themselves. This can make disclosure a tick box 
exercise, rather than creating client understanding. 
 
 
4.3 Methods for quality disclosure 
 
Financial planners were asked about how they ensured that high-quality information was 
presented when so much information was required to be disclosed.  The findings reveal that 
financial planners paid attention to how the information has been presented and how it is 
articulated to their clients. These factors are not often considered but play a key role in the 
usefulness of the information disclosed in financial advice. 
4.4.1. Initial meeting  
Firstly, financial planners spoke of the importance of the initial meeting with clients. 
“I think when you - whenever I have an introductory meeting, we talk about the 
processes of how we go through the financial planning process and fees.  So that just 
direct contact with the client.”  (Respondent E) 
“Yes, so that is really part of the on-boarding, kind of boarding process in the upfront 
you know when we kind of pitch to a new client that that’s what we are doing and how 
we are doing it. That’s our lead-in really, that we are independent, and we are 
incentivised by any product provider and that’s the investment piece.” (Respondent A) 
The first initial meeting was essential to make it clear to the client how the financial advice 
was being provided.  It is also the time when financial planners had to provide the FSG.   
 
4.4.2. Face-to-face communication 
Secondly, financial planners spoke about the importance of face-to-face meetings as a way 
to explain information because it offers the chance for financial planners to get verbal and non-
verbal feedback from clients.  Consider these quotes: 
“I'd rather do the face-to-face.  So we've noticed, we either go to them, or they come 
to us, sort of thing.  Because you can't…it doesn't make sense unless you can eyeball 
them.  I could explain something to someone … and then say, do you understand?  
And they just nod their head, and you know they don't.  So then you've got to make 
sure that…and you can only get that feeling from actually the face-to-face 
discussion.” (Respondent H) 
 
4.4.3. Statement of advice: relevant and material  
Thirdly, the financial planners prioritised disclosure in certain documents, with the SoA 
being the most informative document.  This document connects the client to the advice they 
are seeking. It outlines the client’s objectives, risk profile, and circumstances, which makes it 
personally relevant for the client and gains their attention.  Thus, the quality of the SoA is of 
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utmost importance. For example, respondent E explains the importance of an SoA to explain 
the expected volatility in a portfolio of an investor with a growth risk profile: 
“Statements of Advice, again, I think they are important.  The initial statement of 
advice because this is talking about what are your objectives, this is your risk profile, 
this is the asset allocation we think is appropriate for you, here is the level of volatility 
that you can expect. And clients need to understand that and if they don't understand it, 
at some stage you are going to hit a pothole. So you have got to get back and make sure 
that bit is right.  Lots of clients will tell you I am a growth investor.  Well, you are a 
growth investor until the markets are actually tested and then you really get to see if 
you are a growth investor or not.  If they ring you up every other day saying the markets 
continue to fall, then you are not a growth investor.” (Respondent E) 
Respondent K noted that the importance of the SoA was that the clients could take this away, 
read it at a later time and come back with questions.  This financial planner allowed 2 weeks 
between presenting the SoA and initiating any financial strategy to allow time for a client to 
raise questions. Respondent L also explained that the SoA should include the basis on which 
the advice has been given, information on any payments the advisor will receive, and all 
conflicts of interest that may affect the advice. They suggest a quality SoA should include 
material information that is clear, understandable, concise, and effective.   
 
4.4.4. Visualisation  
Finally, how information is articulated was raised in the research too, yet this is rarely 
considered by legislation. In addition to face-to-face meetings, financial planners argued the 
need to visualise information for clients through pictures, graphs, or videos. This was raised by 
respondent K and L also.  Consider these quotes: 
“It’s got to be easily digestible.  I use a lot of pictures because 70% of people are 
visual learners, 20% they love to see an Excel spreadsheet, and then 10% like to be 
spoken to.  So bearing that in mind my SoAs are very visual with the outcomes and then 
it’s written and then I state it.” (Respondent G) 
“They say a picture is worth a thousand words, right?  So, it’s very important to 
have pictures in the statement of advice.  So, you can have grafts, you can have tables, 
you can have flowcharts just to show them what goes where, rather than have 
paragraphs of information.” (Respondent I) 
5. Discussion of results  
The financial planning industry in Australia has been hit with scandals followed by 
legislation that seeks to improve financial advice through stricter controls on practitioners 
(Steen et al., 2016). One of the major forms of governance in these controls is disclosure 
whereby asymmetric information between financial planners and clients is deemed to be 
reduced through disclosure. The literature on disclosure supports that information asymmetry 
reduction is one potential benefit of disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Lobo and Zhou 
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2001).  However, literature also suggests maladaptive traits to disclosure, such as information 
overload (Saha, et al., 2019), strategic exaggeration, and moral licencing (Cain et al., 2005; 
Sah et al., 2012).  There is a lack of literature on effective disclosure in financial planning to 
assess how disclosure is used and coherence of disclosure for financial planning.  
To address disclosure in financial planning our research addressed how disclosure is used 
as a governance tool to balance asymmetric information, how the quantity of information 
impedes disclosure effectiveness, and finally what techniques are used by financial planners to 
make disclosure effective. The first finding of this paper was to describe the disclosure process 
in financial planning in Australia.  This was necessary as the process is not intuitive because it 
involves financial planners disclosing information created by multiple parties, including 
product providers and AFS licensees. The findings revealed the existence of information 
asymmetry between financial planners and advisees, and the key role of disclosure is to break 
down this information asymmetry. However, disclosure by financial planners is onerous with 
various documents being disclosed, many of which are not created by financial planners. There 
were two main findings relating to the volume and complexity of information.   
Firstly, there was a view that clients were not reading and processing all the information 
that they were provided, showing that information overload was occurring in financial 
planning.  It could be argued that the amount of disclosed information commonly overwhelms 
clients and they cannot process the information, impeding clients’ understanding.  Secondly, 
due to the first finding, financial planners viewed part of their work as filtering information for 
clients by highlighting which parts were relevant. This filtering role, together with conflicts of 
interests for financial planners, could provide an opportunity for agents with opportunistic 
attitudes to accentuate certain aspects of information. The financial planners, however, 
unanimously stated the importance of honesty and trust for building and maintaining long-term 
relationships with clients. 
Overall, the study finds that in relation to quantity compared to the quality of disclosure, 
financial planning in Australia is tilted more towards quantity. Given this, we investigated best 
practices for enhancing the disclosure quality by financial planners, given the aforementioned 
context they find themselves in. There were four main factors that financial planners raised to 
improve disclosure quality.  There were; (1) the importance of initial meetings, (2) using face-
to-face communication, (3) the importance of certain documentation such as the SoA, and (4) 
visualisation of material information. The importance of the initial meeting was to set precise 
standards for giving financial advice and the need for face-to-face communication was to get 
feedback from clients on their level of understanding. This feedback helped in understanding 
clients’ needs to determine what information they should highlight for clients. Financial 
planners viewed the SoA as the key document for clients because it connected their objectives, 
risk profile, and circumstances to the recommendations, established the basis for the advice, 
and outlined any conflicts of interest. An SoA should be clear, concise and include relevant 
and material information to make disclosure effective. It is possible that visualisation of 
information to clients is one way to improve the quality of information when the quantity 
provided is very high. Future research could investigate whether clients understand financial 
disclosure more comprehensively when presented in visual or written formats.   
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6. Conclusion  
This study examined the effectiveness of disclosure as a governance tool in the financial 
planning industry. We adopted a qualitative approach comprised of two phases. The first phase 
involved content analysis of publicly available data to ascertain disclosure requirements, 
apparent issues and critically evaluate disclosure processes, quantity, and quality in financial 
planning. In the second phase (semi-structured interviews), we analysed the state of disclosure 
from the financial planners’ perspective and identified best practices for quality disclosure. The 
findings drew a clear portrait of disclosure as a governance tool within the Australian financial 
planning industry. The paper then critically analysed the principal-agent issues, and the 
interaction between information asymmetry, relevant information, and information overload.  
Our findings outlined how constructing and providing disclosure could be onerous and 
complicated. This may lead to information overload for clients and simultaneously become 
burdensome for financial planners. The findings of this study suggested that clients do not 
commonly read all of the information disclosed and that the role of the financial planner is an 
information filterer who highlights important aspects to clients (as perceived by the financial 
planner). This could potentially provide an opportunity for financial planners to accentuate 
specific information favourable to their benefit. The study also provided evidence for the 
importance of the initial meeting, face-to-face communication, clear and concise statements of 
advice, and visualisation of material information. 
Disclosure topic has received little attention in financial planning despite it being a 
common aspect of providing financial advice. This research is not only adding to the 
fundamental understanding of disclosure practiced in the financial planning industry, but also 
has implications for future research, financial planning practice, education, and society which 
we address in turn.  First, our research illustrated that how disclosure is used to govern financial 
planning throughout the world and a comparison of different disclosure systems, and how the 
systems balance quantity and quality of information, could garner insights into the benefits and 
deficiencies of this form of governance. More specifically, drawing from the diverse practices 
in the financial planning industry, it is revealed that  ‘how’ disclosure occurs is as important as 
‘what’ is disclosed. Future research could ascertain the relationship between how information 
is presented, when information is presented, and what information is presented, to find optimal 
disclosure practices. Specifically, our research highlighted four best practices adopted by 
financial planners and are worth researching further. In future research, it is also important to 
consider how disclosure can lead to better outcomes for consumers of financial advice. 
Second, this research has implications for AFS licensees and financial planners which aim 
for high-quality disclosure.  The study suggested that information should be presented in a 
manner and via a medium, which allows clients to understand it. The quality of an SoA was 
considered to be of utmost importance because clients focus on these documents as it relates to 
their personal circumstances. A quality SoA should be clear, concise, and include relevant and 
material information. The use of visual graphs or flow charts on material information was 
suggested to make information clearer and more understandable. In addition, having a 
mechanism to check a client’s understanding (via face-to-face meetings or giving a client time 
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to process the information) is important. These implications are also relevant to the education 
of financial planners. Financial planning education teaches what information is disclosed.  An 
implication of our research is that financial planners need to be educated on how to disclose 
information and also how to ensure that a client understands disclosed information, to enhance 
the efficacy of the disclosure.   
Finally, a societal implication of the study is associated with emergent financial and non-
financial (e.g. behavioural, and psychological) benefits of the strengthened financial planning 
industry to the vast number of users. Trust in financial institutions has been reduced by scandals 
and malpractice (Report 1). Yet, many people in society rely on financial planners to make 
critical decisions. Thus, apt disclosure should improve the transparency of financial institutions 
and help clients to improve their decision making. An implication of the study for policymakers 
is they need to focus on both the content and the process of disclosing, to improve consumer’s 
understanding and financial decision making. 
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Citation Submissions  Pages Report Name  




530 Final Report Royal Commission into Misconduct 
in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial 
Services Industry Volume 1 
2 Hayne (2018) 375 Interim Report Royal Commission into 
Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and 
Financial Services Industry Volume 1 
3 PJCCFS (2014)  39 103 Inquiry into proposals to lift the professional, 
ethical and education standards in the financial 
services industry - 2014 
4 PJCCFS (2012b) 77 204 Inquiry into the collapse of Trio Capital - 2012 
5 PJCCFS (2012a) 69 220 Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial 
Advice) Bill 2011 and Corporations Amendment 
(Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Bill 
2011 
6 PJCCFS (2009) 407  209 Inquiry into financial products and services in 
Australia  
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Position Company Size 
A 00:53:24  12 years Financial Planner Large Corporation  
1000 + employees 




0-5 employees  
C 00:51:55 17 years Financial 
Planner/Partner 
Medium Firm 150+ employees 
D 01:09:01 16 years Governance 
Director 
Medium Firm 150+ employees 




F 01:03:41 5 years Financial Planner Large 
Corporation  
50,000+ employees 








I 00:33:43 14 years Financial Planner Boutique  
0-5 employees 
J 00:22:48 20 years Financial Planner Boutique 
0-5 employees 
K 00:36:44 5 years Financial Planner Large 
Corporation  
50,000+ employees 
L 00:37:10 18 years Senior Manager 
 
Medium Firm 150+ employees 
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Figure 1: Overview of Disclosure Documents in Financial Planning in Australia 
 
 
